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Abstract 
 
Ethnic diversity and provision of public goods have long been 
understood to share a negative relationship. While there has been a 
concerted effort to define and measure ethnic diversity around the 
world, we are interested in analyzing the possible differences in 
these measures when it comes to using them to explain their 
impact on provision of public goods. Defining public goods using 
a single aggregate measure or using only one variable as proxy is a 
vague concept. It is also unclear specifically which aspects of a 
country’s atmosphere tend to drive the negative relation between 
public goods provision and ethnic diversity. Our empirical analysis 
shows that given the strong impact, there is a lot of room for 
flexibility when choosing the ethnic diversity measure. We also 
introduce three new possible measures of public goods provision 
and by including the major basic public sectors, we conclude that 
the most significant negative impact of ethnic diversity is on the 
health and sanitation sectors.  
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Introduction 
Is the level of poverty in a country measured solely by the purchasing power of an 
individual for private goods? If so, is it exacerbated by a lack of access to basic public goods like 
health care, education, sanitation and infrastructure? The United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization, in their 2008 report has emphasized the importance of public goods provision at 
national, regional and international levels. With a strong presence in the Millennium 
Development Goals, the provision of public goods can increase the productive capacity of a 
country by improving the quality of life as well as law and order by strengthening civil 
institutions.  
While there are multiple factors that can affect the provisioning of public goods, ethnic 
composition of a country has been evidenced to play an important role. Many researchers 
including Banerjee et al. (2005), Habyarimana et al. (2007), Easterly and Levine (1997), Alesina 
et al. (1997) and Miguel and Gugerty (2005) agree that there is a definite and negative impact of 
ethnic diversity on public goods provision. However, there are different views on the specific 
underlying factors that drive this negative relationship; whether it is the lack of social sanctions 
and collective actions (Miguel and Gugerty 2005) or varying preferences amongst ethnic groups 
(Habyarimana, et al. 2007). It is always interesting to see how ethnic compositions in a region 
change over time and how the interactions of various political, historical, geographical and 
demographic characteristics across countries either influence ethnic composition negatively 
(thereby driving down public goods provision) or due to other compensating features, has no 
effect on public goods provision at all. Specifically, we ask, 
1. Is there a fundamental impact of the choice of ethnic diversity measure/index on the level 
of public goods provision? 
2. Is it empirically more desirable to use one aggregate measure of public goods provision 
or to analyze various public goods separately to gauge their relative ‘rival’ natures? 
3. What are the political, historical, geographic and demographic characteristics of a 
country that may be driving the negative relationship between ethnic diversity and public 
goods provision? 
After briefly describing some of the important previous work in this field, we have 
contextualized our empirical contribution. We have also proposed a specific methodology 
incorporating all the relevant aspects and discuss the data used for the technical analysis. Finally 
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we have displayed our results in a tabular format and have discussed the implications and 
limitations of our work.  
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Literature Review 
Differences in the ethnic make-up of various nations have long been perceived to be a 
determining component of the economic growth and prosperity in those nations. Most scholars 
hold the view that political disagreements and preferences over public policies reflect deeply 
rooted ethnic divisions. This was highlighted by Alesina et al. (1999) that even in a developed 
yet ethnically heterogeneous country like United States, urban provision of public goods like 
education and roads is negatively correlated with the extent of ethnic fragmentation in those 
areas. By controlling for income distribution, they use the ethnic fractionalization index to 
separate the effects of ethnic diversity on levels of spending on public goods and find that even 
though ethnically fragmented jurisdictions have higher budgetary spending, their allocation to 
public goods like education, roads and sewerage is lower. Therefore, we would imagine this 
impact of higher ethnic fragmentation leading to lower public goods provision to be more severe 
in developing countries around the world given their additional constraints. 
On a more micro level, Khwaja (2008) conducted a comparative analysis of community-
level issues of public works project maintenance in northern Pakistan. In accordance with 
previous work, Khwaja finds that community level factors like social heterogeneity is inversely 
related to project maintenance while land inequality has a U-shaped relation with project 
maintenance and existence of leadership is positively related to project maintenance with the 
results being robust to community and project specific controls. On a more important level, the 
author finds that even in cases of lower social capital, efficiently designed projects with lower 
appropriation risk, fairer returns distribution and higher involvement of local community and 
NGOs that leads to more publicly available information can drastically increase public project 
maintenance. 
Empirical work in Sub-Saharan Africa, known to be one of the most ethnically diverse 
regions in the world, is extremely insightful for our purposes. One study found an inverse 
relation between public goods provision in the form of local funding of community water wells 
and primary schools and ethnic diversity in western Kenya (Miguel and Gugerty 2005). In 
particular, the authors find that mean local school funding per student reduces by 20 percent 
while the level of operational water wells reduces by 6 percentage points when ethnic diversity 
changed from complete homogeneity to average ethnic diversity (with demographic, geographic 
and socioeconomic controls) suggesting a community-wide impact of ethnic diversity. Miguel 
and Gugerty (2005) also conclude that it is harder for ethnically diverse communities to impose 
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social sanctions on free-riders that lead to a failure of collective action. Like Alesina et al. 
(1999), these authors use the same definition of Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF) for 
computing the ethnic diversity measure (discussed in Methodology). 
To give the issue of ethnic diversity and public goods provision a different perspective, 
Miguel (2004) conducted a comparative analysis between two rural districts; one in Western 
Kenya and the other in Western Tanzania. He shows that in the Kenyan district, there is 25 
percent less funding on primary schools per student in areas of mean ethnic diversity compared 
to homogenous areas while in Tanzania, there is almost no difference between the comparable 
figures. This stark contrast comes because of Tanzania’s ability to institute major nation-building 
reforms including a unifying national language, stronger local governmental institutions and 
public investment that is spread out more equally.  This author also uses the well-known measure 
of ELF to gauge the level of ethnic diversity in the two districts. 
Other studies have attempted to pinpoint the exact factors such as ‘preferences’, 
‘technology’ and ‘strategy mechanism’ that cause the failure of public goods provision 
(Habyarimana, et al. 2007). By having 300 subjects from Kampala, Uganda play series of a game 
with randomized matching between co-ethnics and non co-ethnics, they find similar results to 
those of Miguel and Gugerty (2005). Ethnically homogenous societies have better networks and 
more uniform norms because of which they can effectively impose social sanctions on members 
of their community who do not contribute towards collective action or public goods provision. 
A more recently conducted work in Jordan used Demographic and Health Survey of 1990 
and in which POLAT (2012) analyzes not just the impact of ethnic fragmentation but also of 
ethnically aligned civil organizations on public goods provision. The author constructs measures 
of national and religious fragmentation using survey data from 6461 every-married female 
respondents on their religion and nationality. He finds that public goods provision is related 
negatively (albeit weakly) to the religious fragmentation between the majority Muslims and the 
wealthy minority Christians while it is positively related to national fragmentation related to the 
immigration of Palestinians. Due to these contrasting results, POLAT (2012) advises against 
using a measure of fragmentation that bundles together all the racial, national and religious 
characteristics of an individual. He also finds insignificant evidence that ethnically oriented civil 
institutions impact public goods provision in Jordan.  
In that regards, measuring ethnic diversity across countries is a largely contentious issue 
due to lack of detailed and reliable data. Most researchers have relied on the famous ‘Atlas 
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Narodov Mira’ Ethno-linguistic classification constructed in 1964 by the Soviets which focuses 
majorly on linguistic differences. More recent work on the selection of ethnic diversity argues 
that differentiating between groups based on language largely ignores deeply rooted racial and 
ethnic associations (Alesina, Devleeschauwer, et al. 2002). This is why they set upon the task of 
constructing new measures of fractionalization; one based on ethnicity, second based on 
language and third based on religion. The index of ethnicity combines racial features to a larger 
extent and linguistic features to a smaller extent and covers 650 districts in 190 countries. This is 
why the authors have considered ‘ethnicity’ to be their most important variable for measuring 
ethnic diversity because this index is a more recent one incorporating the relevant features of 
ethnic diversity. They also find a significantly inverse relationship of ethnic fractionalization on 
GDP per capital, telephones per capita and schooling. However, this relation dims down when 
using the linguistic measure and completely fades away when using the religious 
fractionalization measure. This is in contrast to the finding in Jordan where religious 
fragmentation does negatively impact (albeit weakly) public goods provision (POLAT 2012).  
Another highly notable method of constructing a measure for ethnic diversity was 
conceptualized by Fearon (2003). He admits to the fact that there can be multiple ways of 
measuring ethnicity in any country and even in the US, the widely accepted ethnic races include 
White, African American, Asian and Hispanic however, there can be various border-line issues 
with such broad categorization. According to him, the ‘"right list" of ethnic groups for a country 
depend on what people in the country identify as the most socially relevant ethnic grouping’. 
Therefore, he collects datasets from 822 groups in 160 countries using multiple global sources 
and constructs a measure of ethnic fractionalization that allows for ‘other cultural criteria 
distinguishing groups, provided that the groups are locally understood as (primarily) descent 
groups and are locally viewed as socially or politically most consequential.’. He highlights the 
importance of cultural distance between ethnic groups in his measure of ‘cultural 
fractionalization’ and compares this measure to his measure of ethnicity.  
Some researchers consider other ‘economic’ differences among groups of people to be 
important when analyzing the provision of public goods in a country. The measure used for this 
purpose is the Between Group Inequality (BGI); ‘a weighted average of the differences in mean 
incomes (of an ethnic group) across groups in a country’ (Baldwin and Huber 2010). This 
measure can be considered as building upon the ELF measure that takes on the value of 1 when 
income inequality is extreme and 0 when average incomes for all the people are the same. Using 
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principle factor analysis using ten dependent variables (discussed in methodology) Baldwin and 
Huber (2010) find that there is a significant and large inverse relation between public goods 
provision and BGI.  
Finally, the economic literature measuring public goods provision and ethnic diversity 
consider the issue of endogeneity of ethnic diversity with public goods provision. Even though 
empirical researchers often treat ethnic diversity as exogenous, Ahlerup (2009) argues that since 
high ethnic fractionalization negatively affects economic growth and public goods provision, it 
cannot be treated as exogenous. To treat the problem of endogeneity, Ahlerup uses multiple 
instrumental variables for ethnic diversity including Origtime (duration of uninterrupted human 
settlements allowing people to form ethnic groups), VegDiversity (new ethnic groups are formed 
because uneven geographical patterns make public goods provision harder across larger 
distances), Indtime (years since independence; more years would homogenize a society) and 
MigDist (proxy for distance people had to cover to colonize a specific region on Earth). When 
instrumenting for ethnic diversity in this way, ethnic fractionalization is found to have a negative 
and significant causal impact on public goods provision, measured as infant mortality. Related to 
the issue of endogeneity is the issue of time horizon that can change the ethnic diversity measure. 
Alesina et al. (2002) argue that there may be changes in the way ethnic groups are defined or in 
fundamental shifts in the composition of such groups. However, most researchers take ethnic 
diversity to be exogenous over a period of 30 years as it normally takes decades for ethnic 
groups to form or change and that is the stance we adopt in our empirical analysis as well. 
Given a strong foundational work on ethnic diversity’s impact on public goods and 
facilities provision, our research would help to gain better insights into the issues of measuring 
public goods that is, whether to use an aggregate measure or not and what other indicators can 
serve as a decent proxy. It would also highlight how certain characteristics of a country, more 
than others, tend to worsen the impact of ethnic diversity. Those characteristics (or lack of) can 
then serve as the primary target for policymakers when designing public sector projects that have 
maximum possible social efficiency and increases common access. 
Definition of Ethnicity and Comparison of Measures 
The most commonly used measure of ethnic diversity is the ubiquitous ELF or Ethno-
Linguistic Fractionalization which ‘measures the probability that two randomly drawn 
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individuals from the overall population belong to diﬀerent ethnic groups’ and is calculated as 1 
minus the Herfindahl index: 
  ∑   
 
   
 
where ρ indicates the share of the ethnic group k in the total population. One of the advantages of 
this index that makes it popular is the ease of computability on a micro and macro level and its 
intuitive interpretation (Bossert, D’Ambrosio and Ferrara 2005). In our empirical analysis, we 
will use three different indices of ethnic diversity that use similar foundations for computation 
but include slightly varying data and inclusions of ethnic associations. 
One of the earliest attempts to gather data for calculating the ELF index on a cross-
country level was by a team of Soviet ethnographers in the 1960s and was published in the Atlas 
Narodov Mira in 1964. The primary distinguishing factor used to denote one’s ethnicity was 
language and the computed dataset for the index we use for ELF here was compiled by Roeder 
(2001). According to this dataset, Uganda, Tanzania, Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea 
are the most ethnically heterogeneous while North Korea, South Korea, North Yemen, Portugal 
and Japan are the most ethnically homogenous countries. From here on, this index will be 
referred to as ‘ELF85’ since it is for the year 1985. 
In order to incorporate deeper characteristics of ethnicities, Alesina et al. (2002) 
constructed a measure of fragmentation for ethnicity that include racial and linguistic features for 
almost 190 countries. The data sources used include Encyclopedia Britannica, CIA Factbook and 
Minority Rights Group International. In addition to this, they also construct a measure based 
solely on linguistic classifications for 201 countries using data from Encyclopedia Britannica 
2001 and a measure based solely on religion using the same data source but for 215 countries. 
According to this calculation, the American Samoa, Uganda, Liberia, Madagascar and Congo 
Republic are the most ethnically heterogeneous countries while North Korea, Japan, South 
Korea, Tunisia and Malta are the most ethnically homogenous countries. From here on, this 
index will be referred to as ‘Ethnic’. 
The third relevant calculation of cross country ethnic diversity was undertaken by Fearon 
(2003) who consulted multiple sources including CIA’s World Factbook, Encyclopedia 
Britannica, Library of Congress Country Study and other country-specific sources for 160 
countries. Fearon admits that constructing a single measure of ethnicity is a ‘slippery’ concept 
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especially if you want to include features other than language and race. According to his list of 
ethnic fractionalization, Tanzania, Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda and Liberia are the 
most ethnically heterogeneous countries while North Korea, South Korea, Japan, Germany and 
Tunisia are the most ethnically homogenous countries. From here on, this ethnic diversity index 
will be referred to as ‘Ethnic frac’. 
Correlation between these different measures: 
It is interesting to note that the foundations of all of these measures of ethnic diversity are 
the same and so there is high correlation between them. Since Roeder’s index is based on the 
Atlas Narodov Mira’s data, its correlation with the Soviet ELF is 0.88 while it is 0.81 with 
Fearon’s index whose correlation in turn with the Soviet ELF is 0.75 (Fearon 2003). 
Additionally, the ethnicity index constructed by Alesina et al. bears a correlation of 0.76 with the 
Soviet ELF primarily because the latter is a subset of the former (Alesina, Devleeschauwer, et al. 
2002).  
Methodology 
To answer our first question, we have used the three measures of ethnic diversity 
discussed above in our empirical analysis. In order to address our second question of whether or 
not to aggregate measures of public goods provision as dependent variable
4
, we used nine public 
goods variables which have been broadly classified into four groups: 
1. Education which includes ‘total public spending on primary education’, ‘literacy rate’ 
and ‘primary school completion rate’ 
2. Health which includes ‘infant mortality’, ‘rate of immunization for measles’, ‘rate of 
immunization for DPT’ 
3. Water and Sanitation which includes ‘percentage of population with access to improved 
sanitation facilities’, ‘percentage of rural population with access to improved water 
source’ 
4. Communication and infrastructure which includes ‘telephone lines per hundred people’5. 
                                                            
4 Motivation for using these dependent variables as proxies for public goods provision came from Baldwin and 
Huber (2010) although we have not used the exact ten variables used by them due to missing data. 
5 We did not include percentage of urban population with access to water source as this would include private 
consumption of water while rural populations are mostly dependent on public provision. We also did not include 
data on paved roads because of limited data availability. 
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While Baldwin and Huber (2010) have used the technique of Principle Component 
Analysis to aggregate all the public goods variable into one measures, our intuition suggests that 
some public goods may be more rival than others and would therefore be impacted more 
severely by ethnic diversity than other types of public goods. For this reason, we have run 
regressions using all these nine dependent variables separately in the first set of regressions 
(shown in Table-1) and then we also constructed their relevant Principle Component. The first 
point to note is that for PCA (Principle Component Analysis), all the variables should have 
consistent amount of data; for our dataset, two variables had inconsistent data (improved 
sanitation facilities and literacy rate) so we dropped them for the purpose of this index 
construction. For the remaining seven variables, we have consistent data from 114 countries for 
which we created seven components using Stata. These components serve to take out the 
problem of multi-collinearity between the seven variables for public goods provision. Out of 
these seven components, we selected the first one which has the highest Eigenvalue (rule of 
thumb) and which explains 66.1% of the variation between these seven variables. This principle 
component which is defined as ‘a linear combination of optimally-weighted observed variables’ 
(SAS Institute n.d.) is then used to obtain the score for each country using Stata
6
. Looking at 
these scores, we can decide which countries are providing aggregate public goods well and 
which are not; Germany, Greece, Iceland, Japan and Sweden have the highest score while Chad, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Angola and Nigeria have the lowest 
score. This PCA score is then used as dependent variable to conduct the second set of regressions 
(also shown in Table-1 column (12)). In order to further our argument of using a single measure 
of public goods provision proxy, in the second set of regressions, we also used the rank of 
Human Development Index as dependent variable (Table-1). We believe that the rank of HDI 
can be a good proxy for measuring the provision of public goods provision because it is a 
measurement of the development of a country taking into account education, life expectancy and 
incomes. The third aggregate proxy we use for public goods provision is total public sector 
expenditure (as percentage of GDP) on public goods which we believe is a direct and strong 
indicator. 
To address our third research question, we have included a number of insightful control 
variables (shown in Table-2 onwards) which have also been broadly classified
7
. The groups of 
                                                            
6 Command ‘pca varlist; predict f1 f2’ 
7 Definitions for all variables included in Appendix A 
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variables on democracy and history which are of special interest to us include Democracy Index, 
Corruption Index, Freedom Status (Dummy), Procedure to enforce contract and Political Regime 
(Dummy) in the former and Colonization (Dummy), Civil Wars (Dummy) and Years of 
Independence in the latter. We would imagine that countries with lower quality of these variables 
would undermine the provision of public goods. Other control variable groups include 
demography (Log of the area of a country, population density and natural resources) and 
economy (log of GNI per capita in PPP Dollar). Controlling for all these measures would help us 
examine a largely unbiased impact of ethnic diversity on public goods provision. Our model 
using a cross country OLS regression is given by the following equation: 
Yji = β0 + β1j ∑j Xji + β2j ∑ Pji + β3j∑ Zji + β4j ∑ Vji + β5j ∑ Eji + ui 
Yji = Different measures of provision of public goods in country i  
Xji = Different ethnic diversity measures for country i 
Pji = Democratic and Political measures for country i 
Zji = Demographic measures for country i  
Vji = Historical measures for country i 
Eji = Economics measures for country i  
ui = Error term of the model for country i 
The order in which we conducted the series of regressions is as follows: first we 
regressed the three different measures of ethnic diversity (main explanatory variable) on the 
dependent variables for public goods provision separately. Then we regressed the three different 
measures of ethnic diversity (main explanatory variable) on the three aggregate measures of 
public goods provision (PCA, HDI and public sector expenditure). Thirdly, to introduce the 
impact of the control variables, rather than regressing the main explanatory variable and control 
variables with each dependent variable proxying for public goods provision, we picked one 
dependent variable from each of the first three broad classifications and regressed the 
independent variables on them separately. Specifically, for the control included regressions, for 
education we picked ‘primary school completion rate’, for health we picked ‘infant mortality’ 
and for water and sanitation, we picked ‘improved water facilities in rural areas’. This selection 
was based on two criteria: higher variation and higher availability of data. Communication and 
infrastructure was not included because the variation among the data points for telephone lines 
was very weak. Also instead of introducing all of the thirteen control variables together in the 
regression, we progressively added each broad classification in order to tease out the effect of 
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each category on the respective dependent variable for public goods provision. Finally, we ran a 
set of regressions with all the complete control variables and the chosen ethnic diversity measure 
(for that specific regression) on the three aggregate measures of public goods i.e. PCA, HDI and 
public sector expenditure as percentage of GDP. We also regressed Fearon’s index of ethnic 
diversity ‘Ethnic frac’ on all the nine individual dependent variables, including all controls. As 
discussed in the Conclusion section, we only chose Fearon’s index because of a higher 
magnitude and significance of coefficients compared to the other two indices (even though their 
coefficients are also significant and relevant). This was done to see which specific public sectors 
or facilities are more ‘rival’ than others and therefore, are the most undermined. 
Data Sources and Summary Statistics 
Since we have assumed ethnic diversity to be a time-invariant and exogenous factor, we have 
used cross-country data with the following features and characteristics for each variable: 
Variable Name Unit of 
Measurement 
Year Observati
ons 
Mea
n 
Std. 
Dev 
Min Max Source 
Dependent Variables 
Public Spending on 
Primary Education 
%age of GDP 2010 105 4.82 1.90 1.2 12.9 World Bank 
Primary school 
completion 
%age of relevant age 
group 
2010 129 89.1
3 
18.42 35 133 World Bank 
Infant Mortality Per 1000 live births 2010 192 28.4
3 
26.31 2 123 World Bank 
Immunization 
(Measles) 
%age of children 
(12-23 months) 
2010 190 87.2
7 
14.21 33 99 World Bank 
Immunization 
(DPT) 
%age of children 
(12-23 months) 
2010 190 88.4
4 
13.46 33 99 World Bank 
Improved 
Sanitation 
%age of population 
with access 
2010 187 73.2
8 
29.73 10 100 World Bank 
Improved Water 
Source (Rural) 
%age of population 
with access 
2010 187 82.1
0 
20.61 7 100 World Bank 
Improved Water 
Source (Urban) 
%age of population 
with access 
2010 195 94.7
8 
7.84 52 100 World Bank 
Telephone Lines Per 100 people 2010 204 20.8
6 
20.04 0.05 121.1
9 
World Bank 
Nine Dependent 
Variables (PCA) 
Index 2010 114 0 2.15 -
7.46 
2.77 World 
Bank/authors 
HDI (Dependent) Index 2010 169 85 48.93 1 169 World Bank 
Public Sector 
Expenditure 
%age of GDP 2010 109 27.8
4 
11.2 10.6 62.8 World Bank 
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Main Explanatory Variables 
ELF85 Index 1985 179 0.27 0.45 0 0.86 Phillip G. 
Roeder 
(2001) 
Ethnic Index 1979
-
2001 
215 0.44 0.25 0 0.93 Alesina 
(2002) 
Ethnic Frac Index ** 160 0.47 0.26 0 0.95 Fearon 
(2003) 
Control Variables  
Demographic 
Log of Area Square km  213 10.9 3.03 0.70 16.7 Encyclopedi
a Britannica, 
CIA, US 
Stats 
Division, 
other 
governmenta
l sources 
Population Density People per sq. km 2010 208 397.
43 
1946.6
1 
2 1909
4 
World Bank 
Natural Resources % of GDP 2010 184 8.84 14.03 0 74.6 World Bank 
Politics 
Democracy Index Scale 0 to 10
8
 2012 149 5.49 2.27 1.08 9.8 The 
Economist: 
Intelligence 
Unit 
Corruption Index Scale 0 to 100
9
 2012 176 35.4
6 
24.34 0 90 Transparenc
y Intl. 
Freedom Status 
(Dummy) 
Free, Partly (87) free 
(60), Not free (48) 
2012 195     Freedom 
House 
Contract 
Enforcement 
Number of contracts 2010 182 38.0
7 
6.54 21 55 World Bank 
Political Regime 
(Dummy) 
Authoritarian 
Regime (49); Hybrid 
regime (36); 
Flawed Democracy 
(53); 
Full Democracy 
(24). 
2012 152     The 
Economist: 
Intelligence 
Unit 
History 
Colonization 
(Dummy) 
Belgium (3); France 
(26);Italy (1); 
Netherlands (2); 
2013 122     Wikipedia 
                                                            
8 Higher score implies greater extent of democracy 
9 Higher score implies less corruption 
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Portugal (5); Spain 
(20); UK (50); 
USSR (15) 
Civil War 
(Dummy) 
1 if civil war, 0 if 
none 
Civil war (45), None 
(168) 
1970
-
2013 
213     Wikipedia 
Years of 
Independence 
No. of years -- 191     Wikipedia 
Economic 
Log of GNI/Capita PPP (Dollar) 2010 175 8.9 1.27 5.86 11.27 World Bank 
Results 
Results of the first set of regressions (ethnic diversity indices on the separate measures of 
provision of public goods) are shown from column (1) to (9) in the Table-1 in APPENDIX-B. 
The differences in the number of observations are due to differences in the availability of data for 
that particular dependent variable. Coefficients for ‘Ethnic’, ‘ELF85’ and ‘Ethnic frac’ have the 
same explanatory signs and their magnitude is not significantly different from each other in each 
regressions. The interpretation of the coefficient is as follows: for the regression with primary 
completion rate; if there is a 1% or .01 unit increase in ’Ethnic’, then there would be a .3254% 
decline in the primary completion rate and for infant mortality we can see that there would be 
.5301% increase. On average, the coefficients for the regressions where the ‘Ethnic frac’ is the 
explanatory variable, the value is slightly higher than the coefficients obtained from the 
regressions where the ‘Ethnic’ and ‘ELF85’ are the explanatory variables. This is because 
Fearon’s calculation of ‘Ethnic frac’ reflects a generally higher level of ethnic diversity among 
the sample of countries.  
Results shows in column (10) through (12) show the regression of the ethnic diversity 
indices on the aggregate measures of public goods provision. All three of these dependent 
variables are significant and their magnitudes are very similar. For the specific regression using 
Human Development Index, on average, a one percent increase in any of the three ethnic 
diversity indices will increase HDI rank by 0.985 which means that the country is going down 
the ranks in the HDI list (Going down the ranks in HDI list means the country is performing 
poorly than before). If we believe that provision of public goods is one of the indicators of HDI 
(higher access to public goods would increase the quality of life) then we can see that increase in 
ethnic diversity is reducing the provision of public goods. For the specific regression using 
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public sector expenditure (as percentage of GDP) as dependent variable, on average, a one 
percent increase in any of the three ethnic diversity indices will decrease public sector 
expenditure (as percentage of GDP) by 0.18 percent. In the specific regression using our 
originally created PCA index, on average, a one percent increase in any of the three ethnic 
diversity indices will decrease the PCA score by 0.04 units. In summary, all the results in Table-
1 confirm our hypothesis that ethnic diversity negatively affects public goods provision and these 
results are significant at the 1 percent level. Now that this is established, we should be interested 
in controlling for some demographic, political, historical and economic factors in the regression 
series. 
In Table-2, as we proposed earlier, we added the broader classification of control 
variables related to democracy and politics. We believe that these variables indicating the 
strength of civil and legal institutions in a country would be strongly associated with the level of 
public goods provision in a country. On average, a one unit increase in the Democracy Index 
would decrease Infant Mortality by 0.55 percent. Corruption is often perceived to be vital in the 
public sector; on average, a one unit increase in the ‘Corruption Score’ decreases the HDI rank 
by 1.1 which means that the country is going up the ranks in the HDI list
10
. Another important 
indicator we have included is the dummy for ‘Freedom Status’ of a country where our results 
show that there is no clear indication, direction or significance of impact of ‘Freedom Status’ on 
provision of public goods.  
We have also included a dummy for ‘Political Regime’ (Full Democracy, Flawed 
Democracy, Hybrid Regime and Authoritarian Regime) with the ‘Authoritarian Regime’ being 
our benchmark. In column (7) we see that compared to our benchmark, if a country is democratic 
(Full, Flawed or Hybrid) then the PCA score is better (with significant coefficients) meaning that 
the political status of a country plays a vital role in public goods provision. Adding this broader 
classification of democratic and political variables shows that not only do these variables matter 
in public goods provisioning but our three ethnic diversity measures remain significant with the 
same explanatory signs as before with the only difference being a relatively smaller magnitude 
than before. 
In Table-3, we have included three additional control variables specifically historical 
measures; ‘Colonization’, ‘Civil Wars’ and ‘Years since Independence’. For ‘Colonization’ 
which is a dummy variable (indicated by ‘Colon (country name)’, we see that countries that were 
                                                            
10 Higher the corruption score, lower the corruption situation in the country  
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formerly part of the USSR are performing relatively better at providing public goods than 
countries that were colonized by other powers. Another interesting finding is that using Belgium 
as benchmark and on average, countries that were colonized by the British are performing 
relatively worse than the countries that were colonized by other powers including Netherlands, 
Spain and Portugal. The variable ‘Colon (Others)’ means that the respective country was either 
never colonized or was colonized by a country not listed in the data. This ‘Colonization’ dummy 
variable is also highly significant at 1 percent level and this variable is significant not just for the 
three aggregate dependent variables but also for the nine individual public goods provision 
variables. For explaining public sector expenditure as dependent variable or proxy for public 
goods provision, ‘Years Since Independence’ is another important variable; on average, if 
‘Independence period in years’ increase by one more year, public sector expenditure will 
increase by 0.01 percent. For ‘Civil Wars’ which is also a dummy variable, if a country has had a 
civil war since 1970, on average, their HDI would fall by 21 ranks which is an insightful result. 
In Table-4 we have added the third group of control variables which are the Demographic 
measures including ‘log of area of the country’, ‘log of Population Density’ and ‘Natural 
Resources’. For the first two variables we see that the coefficients are not significant from zero 
but for ‘Natural Resources’, we have found that for all three ethnic diversity indices, increasing 
natural resources across countries shows a lower associated PCA score (these results are highly 
significant for ‘ELF85’ and ‘Ethnic frac’). This is perfectly aligned with the ‘tragedy’ of African 
countries; most of them are highly endowed with natural resources but perform poorly in 
provisioning of public goods. We wanted to include two measures of economic performance that 
is, per capita income and income inequality measured by GINI coefficient. Since the data on 
GINI coefficient was very poor, we did not include the second variable. In Table-5 we have 
shown the inclusion of the last group of control measures i.e. GNI/capita, we see that this 
coefficient is significant in all cases. Additionally, all three ethnic diversity measures are losing 
their significance and are reducing in magnitude. This change can be explained by a possible 
problem of reverse causality i.e. a generally improved economic situation would imply better 
public goods provision and vice versa; a classic example of ‘bad control’.  
Including all controls in the regression (Table-6) gives a reasonably well R-squared 
measure (on an average 70 percent). More importantly, we see that for public sector expenditure 
and HDI (the aggregate dependent variables), ‘ELF85’ and ‘Ethnic frac’ remain highly 
significant but in the case of PCA, this significance vanishes. But for ‘Ethnic’, coefficients on all 
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the aggregate measures of dependent variables (PCA, HDI and public sector expenditure) remain 
significant lending credibility to Alesina et al.’s construction. Lastly, we analyze the comparative 
‘rival’ nature of the nine individual dependent variables (for public goods) by regressing the 
‘Ethnic frac’ index on each of these dependent variables and including all controls. These results, 
which are the main conclusion of our paper, are presented in Table-7. We see that on average, 
the public sector that is the most vulnerable to ethnic diversity is the health-care sector 
specifically ‘infant mortality’ followed by the water and sanitation sector proxied by ‘Improved 
sanitation facilities’ and ‘Improved rural water source’ followed by the other two health-sector 
proxies; ‘immunization of measles’ and ‘immunization of DPT’. On the other hand, the public 
sector that is the least vulnerable to ethnic diversity is the education sector proxied by ‘literacy 
rate’, ‘public spending on primary education’ and ‘primary school completion rate’. Our 
intuition for these results is that, as stressed upon continuously by global organizations, 
‘Education for All’ is a common cause and the past few decades have seen a burgeoning public 
and private supply of basic education world-wide. However, the health care and sanitation sector 
still remains neglected in more ethnically heterogeneous societies; it could be that in such 
countries, the wealthier ethnic groups have allocation powers over the scarce health and 
sanitation resources.  
Conclusions and Concerns 
The measures of ethnic diversity created by Roeder (2001), Alesina et al. (2002) and 
Fearon (2003) all point towards the same results as established in previously conducted research; 
ethnic diversity lowers public good provisioning. However, Fearon (2003)’s index of ethnic 
diversity depicts the most significant relationship and higher coefficient values on average, 
compared to the other two indices of ethnic diversity. In fact, the individual measures and 
aggregate measures of provision of public goods are highly influenced by the ethnic diversities in 
a country. The individual measures help us to pinpoint exactly which public sectors (health care 
and sanitation) are being influenced the most by the ethnic composition of a country. The 
inclusion of HDI as an aggregate measure of provisioning of public good is an insightful 
approach in this paper, and the result strongly suggests that controlling for other factors, 
ethnically diverse countries to tend to perform worse on the Human Development Index. For the 
robustness checks, we have controlled for the influential political, democratic, historical and 
demographic variables which have significant impact on explaining the variation in provision of 
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public goods. Including these controls especially of ‘Political regime’, ‘Democracy Index’, 
‘Corruption Score’, ‘Colonization’, ‘Civil War’ and ‘Years since independence’, we have found 
consistent strong and negative significant effects of ethnic diversity on public good provisioning.  
One of the possible concerns of this analysis is that we have assumed ethnic diversity to 
be exogenous; it is possible that allowing it become endogenous and introducing an instrumental 
variable for it might increase the explanatory power of the ethnic diversity variable we have used 
(Ahlerup 2009). Secondly, cross country analysis using secondary data is mostly subject to some 
margin of error especially when we are trying to establish a causal relationship. Historically 
ethnic diversity has been a more or less stable phenomenon so we can safely say that ethnic 
composition was affecting the quality and provision of public goods and not the other way round. 
However, in the past couple of decades, as the rate of migration and refugee movements have 
increased, it could be that ethnic compositions are changing around the world and this could 
make ethnic diversity an endogenous factor.  
All of these suggest a critical role for policy makers in developing countries especially in 
the presence of corruption, civil unrest and violence; factors that are proving to be harder to 
resolve. Specifically, we should be interested in designing cost-efficient public-private 
partnership projects (especially that provide better access to health care facilities and to water 
and sanitation) that focus on community and NGO involvement, greater publicly available 
information and higher incentives for stakeholders to contribute. The governments can also 
follow in Tanzania’s footsteps; by introducing a unifying language and a nation-wide reform 
measures that serve to increase cooperation between ethnic groups including fairer budget 
distributions and political representation for various ethnic factions. 
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APPENDIX –A 
Demographic measures 
Log of the area of the country  
Countries with largest area Countries with smallest area 
Russia Monaco 
Canada Tuvalu 
China Macao SAR, China 
United States Sint Maarten (Dutch part) 
Brazil Bermuda 
(Surface Areas in square kilometers – World Bank Indicators) 
Log of Population 
Countries with largest population Countries with smallest population 
China Tuvalu 
India Palau 
United States St. Martin (French part) 
Indonesia San Marino 
Brazil Turks and Caicos Islands 
(Population Total – World Bank Indicators) 
Natural Resources - Total natural resources rents (% of GDP).   Total natural resources rents 
are the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, and forest 
rents. 
Countries with largest 
Natural Resources 
Iraq 
Republic of Congo 
Mauritania 
Saudi Arabia 
Gabon 
(Total Natural Resources Rents as percentage of GDP – World Bank Indicators) 
Number of countries with no natural resources – 29 
Democratic and Political Measures: 
Democracy index  - The Economist Intelligence Unit’s index of democracy, on a 0 to 10 scale, 
is based on the ratings for 60 indicators grouped in five categories: electoral process and 
pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political 
culture. Each category has a rating on a 0 to 10 scale, and the overall index of democracy is the 
simple average of the five category indexes. The category indexes are based on the sum of the 
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indicator scores in the category, converted to a 0 to 10 scale. Adjustments to the category scores 
are made if countries do not score a 1 in the following critical areas for democracy:  
1. Whether national elections are free and fair 
2. The security of voters 
3. The influence of foreign powers on government  
4. The capability of the civil service to implement policies. 
 
If the scores for the first three questions are 0 (or 0.5), one point (0.5 point) is deducted from the 
index in the relevant category (either the electoral process and pluralism or the functioning of 
government). If the score for 4 is 0, one point is deducted from the functioning of government 
category index. The index values are used to place countries within one of four types of regimes: 
1. Full democracies--scores of 8-10 
2. Flawed democracies--score of 6 to 7.9 
3. Hybrid regimes--scores of 4 to 5.9 
4. Authoritarian regimes--scores below 4 
Threshold points for regime types depend on overall scores that are rounded to one decimal 
point.  
 
Countries with highest democracy 
index 
Countries with lowest democracy 
index 
Norway Saudi Arabia 
Sweden Syria 
Iceland Chad 
Denmark Guinea-Bissau 
New Zealand North Korea 
(Democracy Index 2012 – The Economist Intelligence Unit) 
 
Corruption Index - The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries and territories based on 
how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be. A country or territory’s score indicates the 
perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0 - 100, where 0 means that a country is 
perceived as highly corrupt and 100 means it is perceived as very clean. 
Countries with highest Corruption 
index 
Countries with lowest Corruption 
index 
Denmark Myanmar 
Finland Sudan 
New Zealand Afghanistan 
Sweden North Korea 
Singapore Somalia 
(Corruptions Perceptions Index 2012 – Transparency International) 
 
Freedom Status - Country is assigned a numerical rating from 1 to 7 for both political rights and 
civil liberties, with 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free. The ratings are determined 
by the total number of points (up to 100) each country receives on 10 political rights questions 
and 15 civil liberties questions; countries receive 0 to 4 points on each question, with 0 
representing the smallest degree and 4 the greatest degree of freedom. The average of the 
political rights and civil liberties ratings, known as the freedom rating, determines the overall 
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status: Free (1.0 to 2.5), Partly Free (3.0 to 5.0), or Not Free (5.5 to 7.0). PR and CL stand for 
political rights and civil liberties, respectively; 1 represents the most free and 7 least free. 
 
Countries with highest Freedom 
Status (total 48 countries) 
Countries with lowest Freedom 
Status (total 9 countries) 
United States Equatorial Guinea 
Switzerland North Korea 
Sweden Saudi Arabia 
Norway Somalia 
Luxemburg Sudan 
(Freedom In The World 2012 – Freedom House) 
 
Procedure to enforce contract - Number of procedures to enforce a contract are the number of 
independent actions, mandated by law or courts that demand interaction between the parties of a 
contract or between them and the judge or court officer. 
 
Countries with Largest number of 
procedures to enforce contract 
Countries with lowest number of 
procedures to enforce contract 
Syrian Arab Republic Ireland 
Kosovo Singapore 
Sudan Rwanda 
Belize Austria 
Iraq Belgium 
(Procedures to enforce a contract – World bank Indicators) 
 
 
Political Regime - The Economist Intelligence Unit’s index of democracy, on a 0 to 10 scale, is 
based on the ratings for 60 indicators grouped in five categories: electoral process and pluralism; 
civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture. Each 
category has a rating on a 0 to 10 scale, and the overall index of democracy is the simple average 
of the five category indexes. The category indexes are based on the sum of the indicator scores in 
the category, converted to a 0 to 10 scale. Adjustments to the category scores are made if 
countries do not score a 1 in the following critical areas for democracy:  
1. Whether national elections are free and fair 
2. The security of voters 
3. The influence of foreign powers on government  
4. The capability of the civil service to implement policies. 
 
If the scores for the first three questions are 0 (or 0.5), one point (0.5 point) is deducted from the 
index in the relevant category (either the electoral process and pluralism or the functioning of 
government). If the score for 4 is 0, one point is deducted from the functioning of government 
category index. The index values are used to place countries within one of four types of regimes: 
1. Full democracies--scores of 8-10 
2. Flawed democracies--score of 6 to 7.9 
3. Hybrid regimes--scores of 4 to 5.9 
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4. Authoritarian regimes--scores below 4 
 
Threshold points for regime types depend on overall scores that are rounded to one decimal point 
(The Economist n.d.) 
 
Historical Measures: 
 
Colonization – this variable describes countries by their colonizers. Colonizers: Belgium, 
France, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Uk, USSR are assigned to the countries which 
they’ve colonized (Central Intelligence Agency n.d.). 
 
Civil Wars – Dummy variable is taking value of 1 if country had civil war since 1970, otherwise 
0. Number of countries with civil war  - 45 (Wikipedia n.d.). 
 
Economic Measures  
Log of GNI per capita in 2010  
Countries with largest GNI per 
capita PPP 
Countries with smallest GNI per 
capita PPP 
Qatar Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Macao SAR, China Liberia 
Norway Eritrea 
Luxembourg Burundi 
(World Bank Indicators) 
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APPENDIX-B 
Table 1: Ethnic Diversity Indices on individual measures of public goods provision 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Education Sector Health Sector 
VARIABLES 
Public 
spending on 
education 
Literacy 
rate 
Primary 
completion 
rate 
Infant 
mortality 
Immunization 
measles 
Immunization 
DPT 
Ethnic (Alesina 
et al.) 
-1.684** 
(0.789) 
-32.77*** 
(7.564) 
-32.54*** 
(6.431) 
53.01*** 
(7.201) 
-15.24*** 
(4.382) 
-16.63*** 
(4.113) 
Constant 
5.655*** 
(0.431) 
99.25*** 
(3.653) 
103.4*** 
(2.755) 
4.826 
(3.099) 
94.12*** 
(1.971) 
95.67*** 
(1.751) 
Observations 100 98 120 182 182 182 
R-squared 0.049 0.205 0.186 0.266 0.076 0.099 
ELF85 (Roeder) 
-0.567 
(0.665) 
-28.40*** 
(7.035) 
-31.14*** 
(6.184) 
43.51*** 
(7.273) 
-15.73*** 
(4.523) 
-16.09*** 
(4.229) 
Constant 
5.229*** 
(0.343) 
97.26*** 
(3.319) 
102.5*** 
(2.441) 
9.052** 
(3.622) 
94.22*** 
(2.177) 
95.55*** 
(1.991) 
Observations 89 93 109 164 163 163 
R-squared 0.007 0.174 0.189 0.198 0.091 0.102 
Ethnic frac 
(Fearon) 
-1.546** 
(0.755) 
-36.77*** 
(6.471) 
-32.62*** 
(6.203) 
58.33*** 
(7.152) 
-22.77*** 
(4.142) 
-24.10*** 
(4.103) 
Constant 
5.604*** 
(0.451) 
100.8*** 
(3.101) 
102.8*** 
(2.761) 
2.499 
(3.316) 
98.46*** 
(1.793) 
99.78*** 
(1.694) 
Observations 89 87 101 152 152 152 
R-squared 0.049 0.257 0.197 0.297 0.189 0.221 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
Sanitation and water 
sector 
Communication 
and infrastructure 
sector 
Overall measure of public goods 
 
 
VARIABLES 
Improved 
sanitation 
facilities 
Improved 
water 
source 
rural 
Telephone lines HDI 
Public sector 
expense 
PCA 
Ethnic (Alesina 
et al.) 
-54.09*** 
(8.054) 
-39.18*** 
(5.702) 
-30.32*** 
(5.227) 
99.83*** 
(12.46) 
-17.86*** 
(4.163) 
-4.952*** 
(0.750) 
Constant 
96.33*** 
(3.854) 
98.28*** 
(2.542) 
33.24*** 
(2.855) 
38.64*** 
(6.815) 
34.94*** 
(2.082) 
2.245*** 
(0.354) 
Observations 169 169 183 164 106 109 
R-squared 0.221 0.241 0.160 0.272 0.156 0.340 
ELF85 
(Roeder) 
-54.96*** 
(8.061) 
-31.91*** 
(6.234) 
-28.15*** 
(4.707) 
91.39*** 
(12.28) 
-19.04*** 
(3.960) 
-4.746*** 
(0.722) 
Constant 96.88*** 95.52*** 31.22*** 42.00*** 36.30*** 2.183*** 
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(3.992) (3.174) (2.916) (7.098) (2.116) (0.327) 
Observations 152 154 162 153 98 101 
R-squared 0.249 0.178 0.185 0.255 0.200 0.327 
Ethnic frac 
(Fearon) 
-66.98*** 
(7.663) 
-41.60*** 
(6.182) 
-30.62*** 
(4.632) 
104.4*** 
(12.33) 
-16.90*** 
(4.270) 
-4.891*** 
(0.726) 
Constant 
102.3*** 
(3.884) 
99.37*** 
(2.921) 
31.96*** 
(2.986) 
37.44*** 
(7.283) 
34.83*** 
(2.300) 
2.184*** 
(0.365) 
Observations 143 145 152 144 95 96 
R-squared 0.318 0.256 0.218 0.296 0.141 0.317 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 2: Included controls for democracy and politics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES 
Primary 
completio
n rate 
Infant 
mortality 
Improved 
sanitation 
facilities 
Improved 
water 
source rural 
HDI 
Public 
sector 
expense 
PCA 
Ethnic 
-19.64** 
(7.759) 
33.11*** 
(7.605) 
-40.49*** 
(9.752) 
-22.54*** 
(5.918) 
46.56*** 
(11.14) 
-10.82** 
(5.118) 
-2.621*** 
(0.759) 
Democracy 
Index 
0.608 
(2.553) 
-5.588** 
(2.551) 
1.559 
(3.086) 
1.210 
(1.953) 
-7.104* 
(3.728) 
1.397 
(1.583) 
0.0450 
(0.260) 
Corruption 
Score 
0.0458 
(0.141) 
-0.444*** 
(0.154) 
0.530*** 
(0.182) 
0.537*** 
(0.126) 
-1.093*** 
(0.257) 
0.0521 
(0.121) 
0.0306** 
(0.0122) 
Procedures to 
enforce contact 
-0.468 
(0.287) 
0.356 
(0.332) 
-0.379 
(0.414) 
-0.346 
(0.257) 
0.640 
(0.533) 
-0.259 
(0.233) 
-0.0855*** 
(0.0289) 
Freedom status 
(Not Free) 
9.023 
(5.577) 
-14.18** 
(6.801) 
16.14** 
(7.768) 
5.441 
(5.369) 
-13.82 
(9.336) 
-1.750 
(4.063) 
1.174** 
(0.543) 
Freedom status 
(Partly Free) 
-0.157 
(6.803) 
-5.040 
(7.097) 
4.866 
(8.381) 
4.426 
(5.210) 
1.876 
(9.932) 
-2.225 
(4.047) 
0.177 
(0.651) 
Political regime 
(Flawed Democ.) 
18.77* 
(10.07) 
-0.0940 
(11.75) 
4.324 
(14.25) 
3.099 
(9.100) 
6.833 
(18.25) 
-3.163 
(7.069) 
2.043** 
(0.962) 
Political regime 
(Full Democ.) 
14.05 
(12.61) 
16.28 
(14.62) 
-1.759 
(17.85) 
-9.710 
(11.64) 
13.65 
(23.68) 
-5.006 
(9.342) 
1.357 
(1.305) 
Political regime 
(Hybrid) 
17.78** 
(7.015) 
-0.811 
(8.189) 
-1.135 
(10.55) 
2.468 
(7.265) 
10.88 
(12.82) 
-5.340 
(5.455) 
1.893*** 
(0.593) 
Constant 
94.03*** 
(17.52) 
52.83** 
(20.23) 
67.39*** 
(25.17) 
72.76*** 
(16.52) 
120.9*** 
(29.62) 
35.35*** 
(13.08) 
1.212 
(1.802) 
Observations 90 136 126 129 131 91 84 
R-squared 0.429 0.550 0.425 0.491 0.695 0.313 0.646 
ELF85 
-14.02* 
(8.102) 
26.07*** 
(6.994) 
-34.31*** 
(9.049) 
-20.21*** 
(5.885) 
41.07*** 
(10.58) 
-14.75*** 
(4.383) 
-2.020** 
(0.913) 
Democracy 
Index 
0.674 
(2.553) 
-5.430** 
(2.583) 
3.022 
(3.171) 
1.670 
(1.964) 
-8.054** 
(3.859) 
1.527 
(1.476) 
0.0799 
(0.276) 
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Corruption 
Score 
0.0800 
(0.138) 
-0.444*** 
(0.149) 
0.452** 
(0.178) 
0.508*** 
(0.114) 
-1.059*** 
(0.252) 
0.0535 
 (0.119) 
0.0340*** 
(0.0114) 
Procedures to 
enforce contact 
-0.375 
(0.305) 
0.377 
(0.336) 
-0.208 
(0.405) 
-0.208 
(0.258) 
0.483 
(0.536) 
-0.252 
(0.220) 
-0.0701** 
(0.0312) 
Freedom status 
(Not Free) 
8.898 
(5.929) 
-10.64 
(7.139) 
17.23** 
(8.264) 
0.799 
(5.718) 
-12.69 
(10.17) 
-3.607 
(4.127) 
0.999* 
(0.539) 
Freedom status 
(Partly Free) 
-0.476 
(6.896) 
-4.841 
(7.381) 
2.763 
(8.148) 
4.408 
(5.069) 
3.174 
(9.905) 
-1.519 
(4.106) 
0.0814 
(0.643) 
Political regime 
(Flawed Democ.) 
19.15* 
(10.82) 
0.559 
(12.65) 
3.820 
(15.23) 
-1.088 
(9.561) 
7.776 
(19.35) 
-5.586 
(6.977) 
1.862* 
(1.040) 
Political regime 
(Full Democ.) 
14.78 
(13.76) 
14.71 
(15.35) 
0.320 
(18.68) 
-11.87 
(11.88) 
12.36 
(24.27) 
-7.715 
(9.129) 
1.225 
(1.428) 
Political regime 
(Hybrid) 
18.92** 
(7.353) 
0.265 
(8.797) 
0.823 
(11.32) 
-1.204 
(7.365) 
10.79 
(14.04) 
-7.249 
(5.876) 
1.930*** 
(0.606) 
Constant 
85.98*** 
(17.20) 
52.62*** 
(19.56) 
53.42** 
(25.06) 
69.51*** 
(17.38) 
132.1*** 
(29.69) 
38.28*** 
(12.51) 
0.180 
(1.918) 
Observations 87 132 122 125 127 87 81 
R-squared 0.369 0.509 0.402 0.449 0.681 0.350 0.588 
Ethnic frac 
-12.94 
(7.947) 
31.41*** 
(7.404) 
-42.91*** 
(9.802) 
-20.59*** 
(6.393) 
43.29*** 
(11.60) 
-10.58** 
(5.036) 
-1.767** 
(0.835) 
Democracy 
Index 
0.565 
(2.570) 
-6.224** 
(2.686) 
2.781 
(3.123) 
2.371 
(2.072) 
-9.069** 
(3.879) 
1.720 
(1.634) 
0.159 
(0.276) 
Corruption 
Score 
0.0944 
(0.140) 
-0.427*** 
(0.163) 
0.544*** 
(0.190) 
0.517*** 
(0.129) 
-1.130*** 
(0.274) 
0.0806 
(0.132) 
0.0380*** 
(0.0123) 
Procedures to 
enforce contact 
-0.510* 
(0.302) 
0.293 
(0.344) 
-0.173 
(0.417) 
-0.175 
(0.251) 
0.432 
(0.554) 
-0.228 
(0.240) 
-0.0776** 
(0.0327) 
Freedom status 
(Not Free) 
10.83* 
(6.344) 
-15.04** 
(7.288) 
17.42** 
(7.694) 
6.398 
(5.040) 
-12.90 
(10.06) 
-4.123 
(4.322) 
1.238** 
(0.603) 
Freedom status 
(Partly Free) 
0.287 
(7.079) 
-6.127 
(7.271) 
7.785 
(7.733) 
7.122 
(4.314) 
1.049 
(10.11) 
-3.178 
(3.992) 
0.238 
(0.687) 
Political regime 
(Flawed Democ.) 
20.52* 
(10.67) 
0.244 
(12.37) 
3.384 
(14.71) 
2.896 
(9.249) 
9.927 
(19.04) 
-7.021 
(7.196) 
1.884* 
(1.065) 
Political regime 
(Full Democ.) 
16.99 
(13.53) 
16.26 
(15.24) 
-4.660 
(18.30) 
-10.14 
(11.54) 
20.66 
(23.93) 
-9.983 
(9.586) 
0.998 
(1.434) 
Political regime 
(Hybrid) 
19.27*** 
(7.061) 
-0.479 
(8.486) 
-3.606 
(10.88) 
1.168 
(7.310) 
14.00 
(13.16) 
-6.933 
(5.536) 
1.879*** 
(0.648) 
Constant 
89.12*** 
(17.36) 
58.72*** 
(20.30) 
53.75** 
(24.78) 
59.43*** 
(16.41) 
139.2*** 
(30.55) 
34.43** 
(13.33) 
-0.372 
(1.929) 
Observations 86 129 120 123 124 87 81 
R-squared 0.412 0.535 0.435 0.495 0.701 0.303 0.613 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: Included controls for history (Colonization, Civil Wars and Years since 
independence) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES 
Primary 
completio
n rate 
Infant 
mortality 
Improved 
sanitation 
facilities 
Improved 
water 
source rural 
HDI 
Public 
sector 
expense 
PCA 
Ethnic 
-20.32** 
(8.652) 
37.79*** 
(8.581) 
-37.30*** 
(10.22) 
-28.12*** 
(7.263) 
67.11*** 
(16.34) 
-15.92*** 
(4.828) 
-2.727*** 
(0.989) 
Colon 
(France) 
5.784 
(5.442) 
-17.54 
(17.16) 
-6.651 
(7.952) 
12.85 
(9.523) 
-25.45*** 
(5.745) 
-0.353 
(3.185) 
0.959 
(0.820) 
Colon (Italy) 
 -67.87*** 
(16.63) 
61.84*** 
(6.344) 
 -128.7*** 
(4.716) 
  
Colon 
(Netherlands) 
50.82*** 
(3.202) 
-53.19*** 
(16.96) 
27.96** 
(11.10) 
33.26*** 
(9.287) 
-59.65*** 
(7.040) 
-1.183* 
(0.648) 
3.564*** 
(0.697) 
Colon 
(Others) 
27.43*** 
(5.181) 
-46.31*** 
(16.95) 
26.53*** 
(7.597) 
33.21*** 
(9.437) 
-76.63*** 
(7.996) 
12.41*** 
(3.292) 
4.177*** 
(0.795) 
Colon 
(Portugal) 
1.813 
(4.915) 
-19.57 
(22.15) 
-2.151 
(15.01) 
11.62 
(14.10) 
-34.47* 
(17.54) 
8.286*** 
(1.636) 
0.0274 
(0.767) 
Colon (Spain) 
27.71*** 
(4.335) 
-47.32*** 
(17.07) 
26.66*** 
(6.903) 
28.10*** 
(9.163)  
-64.59*** 
(7.923) 
-3.913 
(3.570) 
3.583*** 
(0.700) 
Colon (USSR) 
36.25*** 
(3.592) 
-46.78*** 
(17.36) 
40.83*** 
(6.978) 
34.72*** 
(10.09) 
-70.87*** 
(7.657) 
10.95*** 
(3.225) 
4.364*** 
(0.767) 
Colon (UK) 
23.81*** 
(4.475) 
-36.98** 
(17.15) 
19.45** 
(7.566) 
32.88*** 
(9.494) 
-61.38*** 
(8.741) 
2.941 
(2.280) 
3.203*** 
(0.764) 
Civil wars 
5.071 
(3.947) 
3.689 
(4.638) 
-5.348 
(5.153) 
-2.112 
(3.575) 
17.37** 
(7.687) 
0.467 
(2.950) 
0.363 
(0.370) 
Independence 
period in 
years 
0.0208* 
(0.0107) 
0.0280 
(0.0343) 
-0.00339 
(0.0248) 
-0.00461 
(0.0188) 
0.00207 
(0.0292) 
0.0107** 
(0.00456) 
0.00154 
(0.000935) 
Constant 
72.07*** 
(6.463) 
47.50*** 
(18.16) 
70.19*** 
(9.217) 
65.73*** 
(10.17) 
111.2*** 
(10.88) 
26.77*** 
(4.245) 
-2.120** 
(0.943) 
Observations 104 157 144 144 143 92 94 
R-squared 0.429 0.446 0.412 0.376 0.452 0.520 0.636 
ELF85 
-22.22** 
(9.129) 
31.40*** 
(8.543) 
-40.22*** 
(10.65) 
-21.78** 
(8.781) 
66.04*** 
(14.39) 
-14.49*** 
(5.031) 
-2.667*** 
(1.000) 
Colon 
(France) 
9.014 
(6.969) 
5.904 
(7.083) 
-13.79* 
(8.076) 
-2.024 
(6.217) 
-25.86*** 
(9.314) 
 -0.137 
(0.764) 
Colon (Italy) 
 -28.19*** 
(1.403) 
37.32*** 
(1.045) 
 -99.42*** 
(1.366) 
  
Colon 
(Netherlands) 
52.11*** 
(7.257) 
-26.99*** 
(6.687) 
22.26* 
(11.51) 
16.85*** 
(6.401) 
-60.32*** 
(11.99) 
-1.337 
(2.877) 
2.223*** 
(0.790) 
Colon 
(Others) 
27.38*** 
(4.916) 
-23.72*** 
(5.015) 
22.04*** 
(5.560) 
22.18*** 
(3.952) 
-81.14*** 
(8.966) 
12.74*** 
(2.926) 
3.006*** 
(0.503) 
Colon 
(Portugal) 
6.072 
(5.728) 
3.962 
(15.12) 
-6.544 
(14.36) 
-2.499 
(11.39) 
-38.26** 
(18.19) 
8.778*** 
(2.481) 
-0.808 
(0.586) 
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Colon (Spain) 
29.99*** 
(4.821) 
-24.21*** 
(5.031) 
20.82*** 
(5.593) 
14.86*** 
(4.124) 
-67.63*** 
(9.248) 
-2.827 
(2.546) 
2.516*** 
(0.415) 
Colon (USSR) 
37.67*** 
(5.783) 
-23.48*** 
(6.723) 
35.63*** 
(6.401) 
20.75*** 
(6.398) 
-73.77*** 
(10.31) 
11.30*** 
(3.136) 
3.145*** 
(0.668) 
Colon (UK) 
20.90*** 
(7.264) 
-9.680 
(7.192) 
10.78 
(7.520) 
16.11** 
(6.352) 
-61.35*** 
(12.04) 
3.873 
(3.067) 
1.512* 
(0.804) 
Civil wars 
1.313 
(4.521) 
7.201 
(4.713) 
-7.667 
(5.135) 
-5.353 
(3.810) 
22.49*** 
(7.757) 
-0.610 
(3.043) 
-0.241 
(0.471) 
Independence 
period in 
years 
0.0128 
(0.0122) 
0.0257 
(0.0326) 
-0.00195 
(0.0241) 
-0.00885 
(0.0203) 
0.00559 
(0.0310) 
0.0128** 
(0.00500) 
0.000525 
(0.00154) 
Constant 
73.07*** 
(5.461) 
25.83*** 
(7.635) 
78.34*** 
(6.813) 
77.98*** 
(5.277) 
111.7*** 
(9.396) 
26.04*** 
(3.180) 
-0.714 
(0.588) 
Observations 97 144 132 134 136 87 89 
R-squared 0.435 0.399 0.456 0.356 0.456 0.495 0.636 
Ethnic frac 
-16.37* 
(9.368) 
40.71*** 
(8.149) 
-45.27*** 
(9.712) 
-28.14*** 
(7.555) 
66.84*** 
(15.22) 
-15.91*** 
(5.015) 
-2.217** 
(1.013) 
Colon 
(France) 
5.964 
(5.812) 
-19.54 
(14.91) 
-5.579 
(6.091) 
13.97 
(8.822) 
-25.93*** 
(7.308) 
0.0635 
(3.515) 
1.007 
(0.936) 
Colon (Italy) 
 -44.97*** 
(14.33) 
37.73*** 
(4.997) 
 -91.65*** 
(8.154) 
  
Colon 
(Netherlands) 
49.51*** 
(3.578) 
-51.08*** 
(14.09) 
18.44*** 
(3.700) 
30.83*** 
(8.256) 
-54.11*** 
(6.345) 
-1.628** 
(0.816) 
3.435*** 
(0.831) 
Colon 
(Others) 
27.23*** 
(5.330) 
-51.15*** 
(14.22) 
32.53*** 
(5.105) 
37.56*** 
(8.337) 
-88.16*** 
(8.500) 
11.49*** 
(3.535) 
4.490*** 
(0.881) 
Colon 
(Portugal) 
3.208 
(4.409) 
-22.94 
(19.60) 
2.352 
(12.46) 
13.76 
(12.66) 
-40.08** 
(15.58) 
7.561*** 
(1.935) 
0.233 
(0.823) 
Colon (Spain) 
31.00*** 
(3.203) 
-51.38*** 
(14.05) 
26.18*** 
(4.713) 
28.52*** 
(8.194) 
-70.15*** 
(8.845) 
-4.586 
(3.991) 
3.688*** 
(0.771) 
Colon (USSR) 
35.88*** 
(3.308) 
-47.68*** 
(14.73) 
41.38*** 
(4.573) 
35.08*** 
(9.135) 
-71.93*** 
(8.210) 
10.22*** 
(3.378) 
4.353*** 
(0.836) 
Colon (UK) 
17.03*** 
(4.702) 
-34.43** 
(14.62) 
16.43*** 
(5.299) 
30.56*** 
(8.633) 
-56.02*** 
(9.300) 
2.513 
(2.838) 
2.689*** 
(0.898) 
Civil wars 
2.344 
(4.470) 
5.809 
(4.490) 
-8.331* 
(4.899) 
-4.621 
(3.800) 
23.90*** 
(7.341) 
0.258 
(3.151) 
0.0360 
(0.487) 
Independence 
period in 
years 
0.00785 
(0.0119) 
0.0315 
(0.0318) 
-0.00327 
(0.0231) 
-0.0101 
(0.0195) 
0.00770 
(0.0281) 
0.0118** 
(0.00471) 
0.000374 
(0.00153) 
Constant 
71.66*** 
(5.998) 
46.00*** 
(15.48) 
74.60*** 
(6.974) 
66.39*** 
(9.026) 
110.2*** 
(10.57) 
27.63*** 
(4.692) 
-2.238** 
(0.950) 
Observations 90 133 124 126 127 84 85 
R-squared 0.494 0.529 0.539 0.428 0.548 0.492 0.637 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Controls included for Demographics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Primary 
completion 
rate 
Infant 
mortality 
Improved 
sanitation 
facilities 
Improved 
water 
source rural 
HDI 
Public 
sector 
expense 
PCA 
Ethnic 
-38.42*** 
(6.472) 
56.44*** 
(7.722) 
-60.81*** 
(9.002) 
-34.82*** 
(5.932) 
104.8*** 
(13.06) 
-17.08*** 
(4.355) 
-4.933*** 
(0.719) 
Ln Area 
0.648 
(1.829) 
0.256 
(1.732) 
-1.950 
(1.999) 
-1.804 
(1.382) 
-1.713 
(3.711) 
0.0217 
(1.009) 
-0.0484 
(0.188) 
Ln Pop 
0.473 
(1.866) 
0.636 
(1.681) 
0.481 
(2.223) 
0.286 
(1.274) 
3.369 
(3.458) 
-2.109* 
(1.093) 
-0.0141 
(0.201) 
Natural 
Resources 
-0.00543 
(0.184) 
0.220 
(0.142) 
0.0407 
(0.161) 
-0.317*** 
(0.117) 
0.151 
(0.265) 
-0.207* 
(0.119) 
-0.0290 
(0.0182) 
Constant 
90.02*** 
(20.50) 
-11.73 
(18.40) 
113.2*** 
(24.71) 
116.6*** 
(13.05) 
4.492 
(35.99) 
70.99*** 
(10.33) 
3.229 
(2.346) 
Observations 100 150 140 143 145 92 93 
R-squared 0.228 0.323 0.277 0.342 0.305 0.281 0.415 
ELF85 
-34.77*** 
(6.786) 
45.02*** 
(7.181) 
-59.09*** 
(8.286) 
-29.76*** 
(5.844) 
90.15*** 
(12.93) 
-16.89*** 
(4.015) 
-4.587*** 
(0.725) 
Ln Area 
1.660 
(1.778) 
-0.940 
(1.846) 
-0.585 
(2.235) 
-1.388 
(1.470) 
-3.515 
(4.061) 
0.0325 
(1.064) 
0.0940 
(0.182) 
Ln Pop 
-0.695 
(1.630) 
1.001 
(1.665) 
0.304 
(2.088) 
0.257 
(1.327) 
4.310 
(3.643) 
-1.619 
(1.182) 
-0.165 
(0.175) 
Natural 
Resources 
-0.0668 
(0.180) 
0.251* 
(0.149) 
0.0133 
(0.177) 
-0.343*** 
(0.123) 
0.206 
(0.291) 
-0.203 
(0.130) 
-0.0392** 
(0.0177) 
Constant 
95.16*** 
(17.51) 
1.171 
(18.21) 
99.46*** 
(21.43) 
110.4*** 
(12.53) 
15.82 
(36.45) 
63.14*** 
(10.87) 
3.840* 
(2.051) 
Observations 97 145 135 138 139 88 89 
R-squared 0.212 0.251 0.284 0.313 0.256 0.288 0.404 
Ethnic frac 
-35.06*** 
(6.633) 
57.40*** 
(7.323) 
-69.51*** 
(8.428) 
-35.52*** 
(6.393) 
105.8*** 
(13.02) 
-15.35*** 
(4.266) 
-4.550*** 
(0.718) 
Ln Area 
1.368 
(1.922) 
-0.0535 
(1.864) 
-1.540 
(2.038) 
-1.623 
(1.491) 
-2.827 
(4.073) 
-0.0948 
(1.092) 
0.0268 
(0.206) 
Ln Pop 
0.360 
(1.909) 
-0.0968 
(1.798) 
0.476 
(2.005) 
0.579 
(1.429) 
3.535 
(3.599) 
-1.675 
(1.110) 
-0.102 
(0.192) 
Natural 
Resources 
-0.0682 
(0.168) 
0.139 
(0.156) 
0.170 
(0.164) 
-0.265** 
(0.126) 
0.107 
(0.301) 
-0.185 
(0.127) 
-0.0373* 
(0.0197) 
Constant 
81.23*** 
(20.17) 
4.455 
(21.32) 
111.8*** 
(22.91) 
109.4*** 
(16.04) 
14.96 
(38.20) 
64.33*** 
(11.23) 
3.572 
(2.225) 
Observations 94 139 131 134 135 89 89 
R-squared 0.219 0.318 0.336 0.325 0.312 0.244 0.390 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5: Included controls of Economic measures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES 
Primary 
completio
n rate 
Infant 
mortality 
Improved 
sanitation 
facilities 
Improved 
water 
source rural 
HDI 
Public 
sector 
expense 
PCA 
Ethnic 
-5.789 
(6.738) 
19.82*** 
(5.713) 
-14.73** 
(6.253) 
-10.91** 
(5.334) 
16.26*** 
(5.879) 
-4.678 
(5.074) 
-1.011 
(0.668) 
Ln GNI (PPP) 
8.966*** 
(1.307) 
-14.79*** 
(1.014) 
18.40*** 
(1.196) 
11.24*** 
(0.945) 
-34.29*** 
(1.169) 
4.426*** 
(1.024) 
1.309*** 
(0.101) 
Constant 
11.53 
(13.65) 
150.7*** 
(10.61) 
-84.39*** 
(13.03) 
-13.67 
(10.33) 
381.3*** 
(11.95) 
-11.17 
(10.66) 
-11.09*** 
(1.134) 
Observations 111 165 154 156 153 104 103 
R-squared 0.441 0.670 0.693 0.592 0.909 0.306 0.713 
ELF 
-9.907 
(6.673) 
16.22*** 
(5.055) 
-23.70*** 
(5.307) 
-14.19*** 
(5.215) 
17.15*** 
(5.161) 
-8.909* 
(4.542) 
-1.363** 
(0.642) 
Ln GNI (PPP) 
8.040*** 
(1.310) 
-14.63*** 
(1.030) 
17.41*** 
(1.102) 
10.31*** 
(0.985) 
-34.60*** 
(1.156) 
4.172*** 
(1.060) 
1.231*** 
(0.101) 
Constant 
21.35 
(13.64) 
150.6*** 
(10.62) 
-71.35*** 
(11.73) 
-3.460 
(10.69) 
383.6*** 
(11.55) 
-6.559 
(11.00) 
-10.25*** 
(1.110) 
Observations 102 151 141 144 144 96 95 
R-squared 0.431 0.648 0.713 0.564 0.911 0.342 0.702 
Ethnicfrac -5.162 
(6.201) 
18.02*** 
(5.341) 
-24.53*** 
(6.158) 
-12.14** 
(5.737) 
15.75*** 
(5.455) 
-1.392 
(4.376) 
-1.165** 
(0.582) 
Ln GNI (PPP) 
9.673*** 
(1.207) 
-15.63*** 
(1.058) 
17.32*** 
(1.168) 
11.27*** 
(0.978) 
-35.09*** 
(1.092) 
5.293*** 
(0.969) 
1.319*** 
(0.0990) 
Constant 
5.356 
(12.78) 
158.5*** 
(10.99) 
-69.55*** 
(12.56) 
-13.20 
(10.74) 
387.5*** 
(10.99) 
-20.05** 
(9.815) 
-11.10*** 
(1.076) 
Observations 97 143 134 137 138 94 92 
R-squared 0.512 0.701 0.713 0.607 0.924 0.354 0.716 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: All controls included 
 Ethnic ELF Ethnicfrac 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 
Public 
sector 
expense 
HDI PCA 
Public 
sector 
expense 
HDI PCA 
Public 
sector 
expense 
HDI PCA 
Ethnic, ELF, 
Ethnicfrac 
-
13.28** 
(5.664) 
39.00**
* 
(14.04) 
-2.044* 
(1.081) 
-11.20** 
(5.072) 
45.04*** 
(12.72) 
-1.944 
(1.223) 
-10.22* 
(5.172) 
39.36**
* 
(14.25) 
-1.220 
(1.102) 
Democracy 
index 
-0.0968 
(1.851) 
-6.859* 
(3.746) 
0.201 
(0.278) 
0.314 
(1.743) 
-9.068** 
(3.839) 
0.188 
(0.303) 
-0.0344 
(1.885) 
-8.412** 
(3.610) 
0.247 
(0.298) 
Corruption score 0.00644 
(0.100) 
-
1.123**
* 
(0.307) 
0.0193 
(0.0134) 
0.0373 
(0.103) 
-
1.099*** 
(0.309) 
0.0267* 
(0.0137) 
0.0683 
(0.110) 
-
1.092**
* 
(0.319) 
0.0281* 
(0.0153) 
Freedom status 
(Not Free) 
-5.179 
(3.448) 
-6.367 
(10.28) 
0.486 
(0.417) 
-5.021 
(3.369) 
-3.405 
(11.32) 
0.501 
(0.454) 
-5.932* 
(3.168) 
-4.878 
(10.23) 
0.605 
(0.449) 
Freedom status 
(Partly Free) 
-2.270 
(3.292) 
3.674 
(10.23) 
-0.0149 
(0.600) 
-2.202 
(3.707) 
4.079 
(9.619) 
-0.147 
(0.545) 
-3.714 
(3.225) 
2.682 
(9.733) 
-0.106 
(0.598) 
Political regime 
(Flawed Democ.) 
-3.397 
(6.889) 
13.61 
(17.66) 
0.730 
(1.159) 
-3.965 
(6.938) 
19.72 
(18.86) 
0.821 
(1.274) 
-5.359 
(7.039) 
15.54 
(17.43) 
0.875 
(1.255) 
Political regime 
(Full Democ.) 
-3.861 
(8.455) 
17.09 
(22.86) 
0.356 
(1.536) 
-4.688 
(8.644) 
22.79 
(22.53) 
0.262 
(1.645) 
-6.520 
(8.901) 
22.51 
(21.42) 
0.184 
(1.670) 
Political regime 
(Hybrid) 
-6.719 
(6.450) 
13.70 
(11.93) 
0.858 
(0.871) 
-6.575 
(6.580) 
18.12 
(13.73) 
1.121 
(0.949) 
-6.651 
(6.390) 
16.22 
(11.92) 
1.066 
(0.941) 
Procedures  to 
enforce contact 
-0.0700 
(0.262) 
0.445 
(0.557) 
0.00172 
(0.0339) 
-0.112 
(0.263) 
0.327 
(0.559) 
0.0129 
(0.0358) 
-0.0987 
(0.266) 
0.179 
(0.534) 
0.0224 
(0.0387) 
Ln area -0.217 
(0.975) 
1.976 
(2.208) 
-0.0596 
(0.180) 
-0.524 
(1.005) 
1.949 
(2.325) 
-0.0409 
(0.193) 
-0.769 
(1.064) 
2.528 
(2.383) 
-0.0954 
(0.200) 
Ln Pop -1.626 
(1.132) 
-2.076 
(2.898) 
0.0490 
(0.187) 
-0.753 
(1.219) 
-3.022 
(2.794) 
-0.00878 
(0.203) 
-0.910 
(1.115) 
-1.919 
(2.992) 
0.0585 
(0.200) 
Natural 
resources 
-0.209 
(0.158) 
-0.416* 
(0.222) 
-0.00498 
(0.0188) 
-0.160 
(0.165) 
-0.539** 
(0.229) 
-0.00838 
(0.0179) 
-0.172 
(0.163) 
-
0.573**
* 
(0.218) 
-0.00767 
(0.0191) 
Civil wars 1.582 
(3.610) 
2.461 
(6.070) 
0.169 
(0.367) 
1.158 
(3.591) 
3.306 
(6.216) 
-0.162 
(0.397) 
0.939 
(3.760) 
6.403 
(6.045) 
-0.0443 
(0.394) 
Colon (France) 
-4.770 
(6.005) 
-24.80* 
(13.84) 
0.335 
(0.771) 
 -38.82** 
(15.44) 
-0.658 
(0.955) 
-4.638 
(6.372) 
-25.40* 
(13.56) 
-0.0649 
(0.859) 
Colon 
(Netherlands) 
-2.349 
(5.746) 
-
47.77**
* 
(17.37) 
1.887* 
(0.998) 
-0.978 
(4.638) 
-
62.10*** 
(20.28) 
0.819 
(1.457) 
-3.037 
(5.719) 
-38.81** 
(16.50) 
1.226 
(1.097) 
Colon (Others) 
8.969 
(7.212) 
-
47.12**
2.293** 
(1.038) 
11.41* 
(5.850) 
-
57.88*** 
1.016 
(1.057) 
8.827 
(7.661) 
-
51.49**
1.891 
(1.195) 
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* 
(15.41) 
(16.67) * 
(15.14) 
Colon (Portugal) 
5.465 
(4.880) 
-29.89* 
(17.19) 
-0.141 
(0.956) 
7.173 
(4.899) 
-44.67** 
(17.57) 
-0.954 
(1.175) 
5.262 
(5.218) 
-30.02* 
(16.93) 
-0.365 
(1.078) 
Colon (Spain) 
-8.204 
(5.907) 
-
53.13**
* 
(14.07) 
2.131** 
(0.907) 
-3.329 
(4.715) 
-
68.59*** 
(15.34) 
1.104 
(0.985) 
-6.921 
(6.393) 
-
54.42**
* 
(14.22) 
1.807* 
(1.015) 
Colon (USSR) 
4.037 
(5.799) 
-
63.55**
* 
(14.13) 
3.050*** 
(0.932) 
8.082* 
(4.677) 
-
80.35*** 
(16.06) 
1.995* 
(1.114) 
4.385 
(5.928) 
-
64.62**
* 
(13.75) 
2.775*** 
(1.015) 
Colon (UK) 
2.017 
(6.620) 
-42.91** 
(16.60) 
1.962** 
(0.952) 
5.349 
(5.108) 
-
55.32*** 
(19.48) 
0.351 
(1.167) 
1.820 
(6.715) 
-40.58** 
(15.46) 
1.148 
(1.044) 
Constant 69.72**
* 
(16.75) 
183.1**
* 
(51.90) 
-3.629 
(2.850) 
52.75*** 
(14.86) 
221.9*** 
(47.48) 
-2.410 
(2.949) 
62.99*** 
(16.02) 
189.6**
* 
(51.14) 
-4.734 
(3.144) 
Observations 85 123 77 81 119 74 82 117 75 
R-squared 0.632 0.748 0.758 0.613 0.753 0.725 0.622 0.777 0.742 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7: All controls and ‘ethnic frac’ on individual dependent variables 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLE
S 
Public 
spendin
g on 
educati
on 
Literacy 
rate 
Primary 
completi
on rate 
Infant 
mortalit
y 
Immuni
zation 
measles 
Immuni
zation 
DPT 
Improve
d 
sanitatio
n 
facilities 
Improve
d water 
source 
rural 
Telepho
ne lines 
Ethnicfrac 
-0.327 
(1.001) 
-13.97 
(8.592) 
-13.77 
(8.587) 
29.43*** 
(8.482) 
-17.00** 
(7.065) 
-
18.94*** 
(6.386) 
-
38.07*** 
(12.24) 
-18.02** 
(7.888) 
-8.524* 
(4.395) 
Democracy 
index 
0.418 
(0.371) 
3.245* 
(1.792) 
1.023 
(2.633) 
-4.360* 
(2.435) 
0.519 
(1.901) 
0.803 
(1.942) 
1.135 
(3.226) 
1.047 
(1.848) 
2.967** 
(1.286) 
Corruption 
score 
0.0153 
(0.0183) 
0.360** 
(0.149) 
0.198 
(0.157) 
-
0.492*** 
(0.179) 
0.205** 
(0.101) 
0.179* 
(0.0929) 
0.549** 
(0.220) 
0.456*** 
(0.131) 
0.295*** 
(0.112) 
Freedom 
status (Not 
Free) 
0.142 
(0.552) 
11.22** 
(5.390) 
7.907 
(4.863) 
-7.932 
(6.044) 
6.818** 
(3.407) 
1.589 
(3.660) 
11.55 
(7.525) 
1.020 
(4.039) 
-0.670 
(4.008) 
Freedom 
status (Partly 
Free) 
1.034 
(0.632) 
9.400** 
(3.782) 
0.123 
(5.431) 
-3.350 
(6.405) 
2.339 
(3.065) 
-0.0235 
(3.121) 
3.517 
(7.800) 
2.943 
(3.871) 
-1.904 
(3.146) 
Political 
regime 
(Flawed 
Democ.) 
-0.362 
(1.322) 
-2.693 
(8.260) 
15.53 
(10.07) 
7.750 
(11.06) 
3.412 
(6.939) 
-3.500 
(7.266) 
0.626 
(14.20) 
0.307 
(8.058) 
-7.644 
(5.376) 
Political 
regime (Full 
Democ.) 
-0.688 
(1.892) 
-12.23 
(9.903) 
13.26 
(14.17) 
21.85* 
(13.03) 
-5.758 
(9.367) 
-11.61 
(9.743) 
-3.427 
(16.76) 
-7.821 
(9.842) 
-5.541 
(8.263) 
Political 
regime 
(Hybrid) 
-0.212 
(0.914) 
-10.30* 
(5.804) 
14.31* 
(7.360) 
4.973 
(7.711) 
0.680 
(4.963) 
-4.527 
(4.933) 
-2.335 
(10.40) 
-1.431 
(6.130) 
-6.225* 
(3.625) 
Procedures  
to enforce 
contact 
-
0.0930*
* 
(0.0432) 
-0.00754 
(0.388) 
0.113 
(0.336) 
0.0943 
(0.311) 
0.202 
(0.213) 
0.0945 
(0.206) 
-0.159 
(0.419) 
0.131 
(0.248) 
-0.290 
(0.212) 
Ln area 
-
0.00641 
(0.191) 
-0.927 
(1.434) 
0.561 
(1.539) 
1.858 
(1.381) 
0.393 
(0.857) 
-0.350 
(0.807) 
-2.670 
(1.847) 
-2.582** 
(1.085) 
-0.541 
(0.993) 
Ln Pop 
-
0.00479 
(0.201) 
1.078 
(1.938) 
1.179 
(1.819) 
-1.796 
(1.864) 
-0.572 
(1.127) 
0.0214 
(1.105) 
1.113 
(2.398) 
2.265* 
(1.358) 
1.393 
(1.286) 
Natural 
resources 
0.0190 
(0.0203) 
0.233 
(0.141) 
0.110 
(0.158) 
-0.163 
(0.121) 
-0.0708 
(0.117) 
-0.0946 
(0.111) 
0.234 
(0.173) 
-0.0827 
(0.111) 
0.0429 
(0.0637) 
Civil wars 
-0.0516 
(0.465) 
-3.541 
(3.815) 
0.696 
(3.854) 
4.235 
(3.560) 
-0.498 
(3.039) 
1.068 
(2.839) 
-2.977 
(4.955) 
-2.378 
(3.432) 
-0.121 
(1.945) 
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Colon 
(France) 
-0.239 
(1.854) 
-10.75 
(10.10) 
1.859 
(6.811) 
-
24.62*** 
(8.345) 
-
15.30*** 
(5.740) 
-2.723 
(9.629) 
-10.77 
(8.794) 
6.212 
(11.46) 
0.827 
(4.454) 
Colon 
(Netherlands
) 
-1.940 
(1.871) 
 
30.30*** 
(9.061) 
-
53.33*** 
(9.929) 
3.712 
(6.103) 
-12.38 
(9.402) 
19.23 
(12.09) 
18.34 
(11.80) 
7.278 
(5.531) 
Colon 
(Others) 
-1.200 
(1.848) 
12.37 
(7.465) 
9.134 
(8.912) 
-
45.76*** 
(8.670) 
-4.638 
(6.096) 
5.089 
(9.555) 
14.79 
(10.20) 
20.49* 
(11.63) 
8.201 
(5.055) 
Colon 
(Portugal) 
0.182 
(1.900) 
-1.437 
(5.420) 
-0.910 
(17.56) 
-27.36 
(17.89) 
-1.016 
(8.077) 
11.59 
(9.588) 
14.09 
(12.36) 
11.42 
(12.45) 
4.633 
(4.458) 
Colon 
(Spain) 
-1.534 
(1.856) 
17.26*** 
(6.229) 
18.54** 
(7.137) 
-
51.86*** 
(7.975) 
-1.149 
(5.346) 
8.093 
(9.149) 
21.03** 
(8.860) 
17.62 
(11.16) 
2.777 
(4.672) 
Colon 
(USSR) 
-0.401 
(1.873) 
26.10*** 
(6.979) 
26.85*** 
(7.141) 
-
52.31*** 
(8.354) 
-0.360 
(6.543) 
7.144 
(9.890) 
32.69*** 
(9.256) 
29.47** 
(11.43) 
14.50*** 
(5.041) 
Colon (UK) 
-0.922 
(1.851) 
4.586 
(8.259) 
5.429 
(8.131) 
-
39.03*** 
(9.255) 
-0.268 
(5.609) 
10.08 
(9.109) 
10.96 
(10.15) 
22.77* 
(11.72) 
3.025 
(5.050) 
Constant 
6.053* 
(3.216) 
39.56 
(30.72) 
24.30 
(32.30) 
100.7*** 
(29.36) 
82.96*** 
(18.88) 
84.27*** 
(20.33) 
63.74 
(38.71) 
37.96 
(25.02) 
-12.68 
(18.22) 
Observations 69 70 80 121 121 121 113 116 121 
R-squared 0.366 0.724 0.643 0.686 0.385 0.391 0.607 0.671 0.700 
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